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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE
McCOOK CASE.**
By WALTER F. DODD*
I. THE GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL OF LEGISLATION
IN CONNECTICUT.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in the case of
State v. McCook, decided July 25, 1929, determined an important
question as to the time within which the governor may approve
legislation in this State. Article IV, sec. 12 of the constitution
of Connecticut, framed in 1818, is, with verbal changes, and
with differences of the period for executive consideration and
in legislative majorities, substantially the same as the provision
of the constitution of the United States with respect to execu-
tive approval or disapproval of legislation. The Connecticut
provision reads as follows:
"Every bill which shall have passed both houses of the
General Assembly, shall be presented to the Governour.
If he approves, he shall sign and transmit it to the Sec-
retary, but if not, he shall return it to the house in which
it originated, with his objections, which shall be entered
*This case is now reported in 147 Atl. 127.
*Professor Dodd is a member of the faculty of the Yale Univer-
sity School of Law.
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on the journals of the house; who shall proceed to re-
consider the bill. If after such reconsideration, that house
shall again pass it, it shall be sent, with the objections, to
the other house, which shall also reconsider it. If ap-
proved, it shall become a law. But in such cases the votes
of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and
the names of the members voting for and against the
bill, shall be entered on the journals of each house re-
spectively. If the bill shall not be returned by the Gov-
ernour within three days, Sundays excepted, after it
shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law,
in like manner as if he had signed it; unless the General
Assembly, by their adjournment, prevents its return, in
which case it shall not be a law."
The last sentence of this provision is the most important and
the least clear. The power of the governor to approve bills
after legislative adjournment has become increasingly important
in Connecticut and in all other states, because of the legislative
practice of passing the bulk of legislation in the last few days
of the session. The McCook case involved the governor's ap-
proval of a measure passed in 1925. Of the 779 bills passed by
the Connecticut General Assembly in that year, 322 came to the
governor after final adjournment of the legislature. The num-
ber and proportion of the bills so coming to the governor after
adjournment was substantially larger in 1927 and 1929.
The Connecticut General Assembly adjourned on June 3,
1925. The measure here involved was presented to the governor
on June 22, 1925, and was signed by him on the day of pre-
sentation. Although basing its decision that the act was invalid
partly upon other grounds, the court held that "bills presented
to the governor may not be signed by him more than three days
(Sundays excepted) after the final adjournment of the General
Assembly."
The Connecticut constitutional provision is capable of at least
four constructions:
(1) It may be argued with some plausibility that the words,
"unless the General Assembly, by their adjournment, prevents
HeinOnline  -- 3 Conn. B.J. 218 1929
THE McCOOK CASE
its return" relates of necessity only to disapproved bills, and
that approved bills are not to be returned. This view is sup-
ported by language of judge Denio in People v. Bowen,, with
reference to a similar New York provision:
"It is plain that this relates exclusively to bills which
the Governor has neglected to approve and sign. It is
such bills, and not those which he has approved and
signed, which are not to become laws on account of a
premature adjournment of the legislature. The provision
does not qualify the mandate contained in the earlier
part of the section, by which it is enjoined upon the
Governor, that, if he approves of a bill, he shall sign it.
I am, therefore, of opinion that there is nothing in the
language of the Constitution forbidding the approving
and signing of a bill by the Governor after the session
of the legislature shall have terminated by an adjourn-
ment. If he cannot legally do so, it is on account of some
implication arising out of the nature of the subject or of
the act to be performed, or the general arrangements of
the Constitution. * * *
"It is argued that, upon the construction which I-have
suggested, no time whatever is fixed within which bills
are, in such cases, to be signed, and that, if it can be
done after the adjournment, it may be done at any in-
definite period thereafter; and that the inconvenience
would arise, that it might remain a long time uncertain
whether a measure which has received the assent of both
branches of the legislature should eventually be a law or
not. This consequence will certainly follow, unless there
is an implication arising out of the fixing of a period of
ten days for the consideration of bills presented to the
Governor while the legislature remain in actual session.
It is plain that the authors of the Constitution considered
that period sufficiently long for the performance of that
duty; and I think he would not be justified in acting upon
a bill after his ten days had elapsed, whether the session
continued or not. But, if this were otherwise, it would
People v. Bowen, 21 N. Y., 517, at p. 519, 520 (1860).
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not afford a reason for adding to the Constitution, by a
judicial determination, a qualification of the power of
the Governor to approve bills which is not contained in
the instrument. The Constitution does not often pre-
scribe detailed provisions for the regulation of the de-
partments of the Government. A general power is usually
conferred, and it is then left to the legislature to provide
by law as to the time and manner of its performance.
But if we concede that the limitation of ten days does
not apply, and that a limitation cannot be fixed by law.
I am of opinion that the concession would not auth-
orize a determination against the existence of the right to
approve bills after the adjournment. It would plainly
be the duty of the Governor to act upon such bills as had
been left in his hands on the adjournment, at the earliest
practicable time thereafter. The nature of the duty, and
the inconveniences of delay, would sufficiently inculcate
the obligation of diligence in that respect. * * *"
But, as Judge Denio's language indicates, it was unnecessary in
this case to go beyond holding that the governor's power ex-
tended to a fixed number of days beyond adjournment. Under
the view suggested by Judge Denio there is no time limit upon
the governor's power to approve, and in Connecticut he would
have been able to act favorably upon bills passed by the legis-
lature in 1925, during the period from June, 1925 to January,
1927. This alone properly leads to a rejection of the construc-
tion, especially when coupled with a constitutional or statutory
provision as to the date upon which new legislation shall be-
come effective. Such a proposed construction would also neg-
lect the effect of the first clause of the sentence, which by limit-
ing the governor's period for either favorable or unfavorable
consideration during the session, evidences an intention opposed
to an unlimited period for consideration after adjournment. The
Connecticut court quite properly rejected such a construction.
(2) It may be argued with equal plausibility that any re-
turn of the bill ceases to be possible immediately upon the ad-
journment of the General Assembly, and that upon such ad-
journment, therefore, return being prevented, the "bill shall not
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be a law." This would require that, if it is to become law,
through approval by the governor, every bill be presented. to
the governor and acted upon by him before legislative adjourn-
ment. With a few exceptions this has been the practical con-
struction of substantially identical language in the constitution
of the United States. A different view was taken by President
Wilson in 1920, with the approval of the Attorney General of
the United States, and was the occasion for a valuable discussion
of the problem by Professor Lindsay Rogers.' The view that
no power exists to approve after legislative adjournment pro-
ceeds largely on the theory that the governor is acting as a
branch of the legislature and not as an executive, and has the
support of decisions in California, 3 Nevada, 4 and Mississippi,3
of an opinion of the justices in Massachusetts, 6 and of opinions
of the Attorney General of the United States before 1920. But
the view of the Attorney General has been altered ;7 constitution-
al changes in California, Massachusetts and Nevada have ren-
dered the decisions in those states inapplicable; and the Missis-
sippi court reversed its decision in 1887.8 It is true that the
Mississippi constitution of 1890 expressly provides that "no bill
shall be approved wlen the legislature is not in session," but
this express provision lends no aid to the suggested construc-
tion of the Connecticut provision. Such a construction has
little support in present authorities, and is based upon an er-
roneous theory of the governor's power over legislation. The
governor is not acting as an organ of the legislative department
but as an executive exercising a qualified veto power conferred
upon him by the constitution.9
2 Rogers, The Power of the President to Sign Bills after Con-
gress has Adjourned. (1920), 30 Yale Law Journal 1.
3 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165 (1852). See also suggestion in
Solomon v. Commissioners of Cartersville, 41 Ga. 157 (1870).
4 Trustees of School District No. 1 v. County Commissioners of
Ormsby County, 1 Nev., 334 (1865).
5 Hardee v. Gibbs, 50 Miss., 802 (1874).
6 Opinion of the Justices, 3 Mass., 567 (1791).:
7 32 Opinions of the Attorney General, 225 (1920).
8 State ex rel Attorney General v. Board of Supervisors of Coa-
homa Co., 64 Miss., 358; 1 So. 501 (1887).
9 See Board of Education v. Morgan, 316 Ill., 143 (1925), and
Hartness v. Black, 95 VL, 190, 201 (1921).
HeinOnline  -- 3 Conn. B.J. 221 1929
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
(3) A third possible construction is that the constitution
expressly gives to the governor a period of three days after the
presentation of each bill in which to approve it or to return it
with his objections. No exceptions are made and none exist.
There is a continuing power to approve during this time, ir-
respective of adjournment, and the three days given to the
governor with respect to the bill, by the explicit terms of the
constitution, run from the time that "it shall have been presented
to him." The allotted period is for executive consideration
of the bill, and he cannot begin to consider it until it has been
presented to him. In a prior decision 0 the Connecticut court
had said:
"The commencement of this period of not exceeding
three days, given by the Constitution to the Governor
for the consideration of every bill which has been duly
passed by both houses, is certain. It begins when the
bill is presented to him. It cannot be deemed to have
been presented to him until it has been in some way
put into his custody, or into that of some one properly
representing him, in such a manner that he has a reason-
able opportunity to inspect and consider it."
The view that the executive may approve after adjournment
within the constitutionally prescribed period is not only the more
practical, but is more directly in line both with the language
and with the purpose of the constitution. It is the more com-
monly adopted construction of constitutional provisions similar
to that of Connecticut. If a power exists to approve after
adjournment, and is limited to the days prescribed in the con-
stitution, it would appear necessarily to follow that the period
begins to run upon presentation of the bill to the governor. This
is expressed or clearly implied in decisions construing the con-
10 State v. South Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257, 260 (1904). For a dis-
cussion of the technical question as to when a bill is presented, see
Oliver P. Field, Presentation of Bills to the Governor, 56 American
Law Review, 898 (1922).
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stitutions of Illinois," Maryland,'1 2 and Vermont,' and in the
opinion of the Attorney General of the United States. 4 In the
New York case of People v. Bowen," the court discusses broadly
the power of the governor to approve after adjournment, and
Judge Denio said that "I think he would not be justified in
acting upon a bill after his ten days had elapsed, whether the
session continued or not," without indicating at what point the
ten days would begin, though the whole opinion is based on
the theory that the ten days would be the same both before and
after adjournment-that is, ten days after presentation to the
governor.
(4) A fourth construction, and that adopted by the court
in this case, is that a power to approve continues after legis-
lative adjournment, but can be exercised only within the three
days (Sundays excepted) after the adjournment, irrespective
of when bills may have been presented to the governor. This
fourth view rests upon the same arguments as the third, so far
as it supports a power to approve within a limited period after
adjournment. But in having the three day period run from
adjournment rather than from presentation to the governor,
this view runs counter to the constitutional language, and finds
no support in the statement of the Supreme Court of Georgia16
that the governor had signed bills within five days after ad-
j ournment.
The recent Connecticut decision involved no issue as to
computation of time, except as to when the three day period
begins." The court's opinion does not indicate a consideration
of alternative (3) as set out above, but explicitly limits the
choice to an unlimited period upon the part of the governor as
11 Town of Seven Hickory v. Ellery, 103 U. S. 423 (1881), con-
struing the Illinois constitution of 1848. And see Board of Education
v. Morgan, 316 Ill., 143 (1925).
12 Lankford v. Connty Commissioners of Somerset County, 73
Md., 105 (1890).
13 Hartness v. Black, 95 Vt., 1^0 (1921).
14 32 Opinions of the Attorney General, 225 (1920).
15 21 N. Y., 517 (1860).
16 Solomon v. Commissioner of Cartersvllle, 41 Ga. 157 (1870).
17 For the exclusion of Sundays and holidays, see State v. Holm.
172 Minn., 162, 215 N. W., 200 (1927), and note in 52 A. L. R. 339.
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contrasted with a period limited to three days from adjourn-
ment. The authorities cited by the court support the third
rather than the fourth alternative, as does the explicit language
of the constitution of Connecticut. Not only this, but sub-
stantially the whole argument against an unlimited period for
approval supports the third as well as the fourth alternative."
The arguments as to practical and contemporaneous construction
as presented by the court in no way support the view of the
court as distinguished from that based on time of presentation.
But the court apparently proceeds upon the theory that, in
view of a Connecticut statute not referred to in its opinion,
there is no difference between the third and fourth alternatives,
for its language in at least one place appears explicitly to adopt
the third alternative. Section 42 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut provides:
"All bills for acts and resolutions which shall be passed
by the two houses of the general assembly, but which
shall not have been engrossed prior to the final adjourn-
ment thereof, shall be transmitted to the governor for
his approval; and, if approved by him, he shall sign the
same, indorsing his approval thereon, and transmit the
same to the secretary; and the secretary shall thereafter
engross the said bills, under the direction of the en-
grossing committee, and, when so engrossed, they shall
receive the signatures of the presiding officers of the two
houses, the clerks and the governor, in the manner pro-
vided by law; and such bills so passed, signed and ap-
proved, shall from and after their said approval have
the same force and validity as all otheflaws of the state."
This was argued by McCook's counsel to require that all bills
be presented to the governor "at the moment of adjournment."
Were this done, the three days after adjournment would be
18 There may occasionally be an extreme case under the third
alternative in which by mistake a measure actually passed fails to be
presented promptly to the governor. The only case of this character
known to the author of this comment is that of an act passed by the
Illinois legislature in 1925, but overlooked by the clerical officers of
the legislature and not presented to the governor until May 19, 1926.
See Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes, 1927, p. 2296.
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identical with three days after presentation. But, with 322 bills
passed at the close of the session in 1925, preparation even in
unengrossed form for presentation to the governor would take
some time, and an identity of time of presentation with time of
adjournment could never in fact exist. The court's view that
it must choose between a fixed period after adjournment and
an unlimited period for approval derives some support from the
fact that nineteen days intervened between legislative adjourn-
ment and the presentation and approval of the measure involved
in the present case. And obviously a two-months' interval such
as occurred with respect to one act in 1927 is so excessive as
to constitute an abuse.
As a matter of fact, were the statute in the McCook case not
being held invalid on other grounds, it would have been saved
by having the three days begin with presentation to the governor
rather than with the legislative adjournment. In his message
to the special session of the Connecticut General Assembly,
convened on August 6, 1929, Governor John H. Trumbull as-
serted that the measure involved in this case was signed by him
on the day of its presentation, although the record shows this
to have been nineteen days after legislative adjournment.
'rhe decision in the McCook case presents two practical ques-
tions: (a) The court having explicitly declared that all acts not
signed within three days after the final adjournment of the
legislature are void, some fifteen hundred legislative acts (almost
all adopted in the period 1919-1929) immediately became subject
to successful attack; (b) Under present legislative methods, it
is physically impossible to present all measures to the governor
within three days after legislative adjournment, and obviously
impossible, therefore, for the governor to consider such measures.
The practical problem as to the time available for executive
consideration of measures was fully discussed by the court:
"The burden imposed upon the governor of having a
very considerable percentage of all bills passed at the
session of the general assembly returned to him after its
final adjournment-many of these the most important of
the session-literally prevents his fair consideration of
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the merits of this mass of legislation within the consti-
tutional three day period. If he signs all of these bills
the people may be deprived of the governor's considered
view of these measures and the constitutional check upon
hasty, ill-considerd and publicly inimical legislation re-
moved by the pressure of the burden placed upon the
governor. On the other hand, bills which the governor
does not sign, however meritorious they may be, will fail
to become law. The avoidance of this untoward public
situation is neither hard to see nor difficult to enforce.
A better distribution and a prompter disposition of the
business of the general assembly and the avoidance of
leaving the most important bills to the closing days of
the session will not only relieve the governor from the
burden of a duty which is impossible of proper perform-
ance, except under most exceptional circumstances, but
will also tend to give the general assembly the opportunity
for more extended consideration of important measures.
A recess taken by the general assembly, after it is through
with its business, of ten days, would give the governor
the opportunity of fairly considering bills returned to
him, and give the general assembly the opportunity of
reconsidering bills returned to it disapproved of by him.
This course would not conflict with the power of the
governor in signing bills within the period prescribed by
the constitution after the final adjournment of the gen-
eral assembly."
The court's suggestions are intelligent and in part practical.
The practice of enacting a great mass of legislation in the con-
fusion of the closing days of a legislative session is foolish and
indefensible, but the court's remarks are not likely to alter such
a bad practice. The suggestion of a ten day recess is practicable.
The liberal constitutional limit of five months upon the length
of the legislative session in Connecticut would make it readily
possible to treat the session as terminating (for the original con-
sideration of bills) fifteen days before the constitutional ex-
piration of the session. A recess of ten days or more would
then permit the preparation of bills and their submission to the
governor before the termination of the recess. Although some
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bills probably would not be ready for presentation to him for
perhaps ten days after their passage, he would have three days
after presentation of each bill. The reconvening after the recess
would probably be a mere formality, but the formality would
save the day constitutionally. All the real work of the legislature
having been done before its recess, the experience of Illinois
with a similar plan is that a quorum does not attend when the
legislature reconvenes, but on reconvening, a motion for final
adjournment is about the only business, and a quorum is not
necessary for the adoption of such a motion.
Aside from the immediate problem as to some 1500 laws
affected by the McCook case, it is from a practical standpoint
immaterial whether the three day period begins with adjourn-
ment or with presentation of a bill to the governor. Certainty
of rule is here more important than technical accuracy of con-
stitutional construction. Three days is normally a long enough
period for consideration of one bill, but is obviously insufficient
for three or four hundred bills. A distribution of the governor's
work of passing upon bills may be accomplished either (1) by
allowing him three days after presentation of each bill upon
final adjournment, the preparation for presentation of necessity
taking some time, the bills coming to him day by day as they
are ready, and the governor having a number of days to dispose
of the whole mass of legislation; or (2) by accomplishing the
same purpose by a recess after the completion of the work of
legislation, with a subsequent formal session for adjournment.
Either plan would seem to be supported by the Connecticut
constitutional text, but the limitation to the second by the re-
jection of the first is harmless even under the present legislative
practice of passing the great bulk of legislation at the end of
the session. And the second plan has the advantage of im-
posing a specific time limit not present in the first. It is, how-
ever, obvious that, under any adjustment, the constitutional limit
of three days is too short. This situation can only be met by
constitutional amendment. Such an amendment may wisely
abolish the pocket veto, and provide, as does Coloradp, that
where the adjournment of the General Assembly prevents the
return of a bill "it shall be filed with his objections, in the office
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of the secretary of state within thirty days after such adjourn-
ment, or else become a law." 19
II. THE MC COOK CASE AND THE VALIDATING
ACTS.
Effect of the McCook Case.
One of the immediate effects of the McCook case was a
material unsettling of the law of Connecticut. The court said
that all legislative acts, whether public or private, signed by the
governor more than three days after the final adjournment of
the state legislature, are void. This statement affects some
fifteen hundred legislative acts, passed by the legislature over
a period of more than ten years. Many of these fifteen hundred
measures constitute an important part of the public law of the
State and have been acted upon for some years as valid parts
of that law.
The court expressly stated that it realized the serious con-
sequences that might follow a declaration that such a great mass
of legislation is void. Technically, the decision of the court
declared invalid only the one legislative act directly involved in
the McCook case, but it opened the door for immediate attack
upon all other statutes which had been approved nore than
three days after legislative adjournment and, under the view
announced by the court, attacks were bound to succeed.
It is of interest to indicate a few of the things sought to be
accomplished by acts passed in 1927 and generally regarded as
part of the State's law, but now falling within the condemnation
of the McCook case: the taxation of motor busses and of places
of amusement; the motor vehicle guest statute; substantial varia-
tions in conditions of payment to injured workmen under the
workmen's compensation act; the creation of the state judicial
council and of new offices in State and local government; pur-
chase and sale of public property; penalties for failure to file
tax lists; regulation of aviation, with penalties of fine and im-
prisonment for the violation of the regulations imposed. These
19 Colorado Constitution of 1876, Art. IV, sec. 11.
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illustrations may readily be multiplied by ten, if all laws affected
by the McCook case are examined. Under these and numerous
other statutes (open to the same objection) money had been
paid from the public treasury; property had been conveyed
from and to the State; persons had been deprived of remedies
previously existing by statute or at common law; large sums
of money have been collected in public taxes, and penalties had
been imposed under tax laws; individuals had been tried and
convicted of criminal offenses, and some of them may still be
serving sentences under such convictions. If the statutes under
which these transactions occurred were void, what as to the
transactions themselves? And what if all of these apparent laws
ceased to be of any effect for the future? These very practical
questions demanded some immediate answer. An answer was
given by the special session of the Connecticut General Assem-
bly which convened on August 6, 1929. Whether this answer
shall stand awaits determination by the Supreme Court of Errors
of the State. Let us first consider the legislative answer, and
then some of the issues that it presents for later judicial deter-
mination.
The Validating Acts.
Of the eight acts passed by the recent special session, one
has to do with the new revision of the general statutes, and two
were merely incidental to the fact that there was a special ses-
sion. Five measures were devoted directly to the situation
presented by the McCook case. Stated briefly, the five acts
taken together seek to accomplish the following results:
(1) To reenact and make effective for the future all bills
in the official records of the State (other than those specifically
declared invalid by the courts) which were passed by the two
houses, and approved by the governor more than three days
after adjournment. The measures so sought to be enacted for
future effect are not set out in full or even enumerated.
(2) To make every such bill, whether relating to civil rights
or criminal matters, effective from the date of original signature
or approval by the governor, and to validate the presentation
and approval of such bills.
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(3) To give to every act done or omitted, liability or pen-
alty incurred under, or imposed, or protection afforded by the
terms of any such bill, as full and complete effect as if such
bills were signed within three days after legislative adjournment.
(4) To restrict the contest of the validity of such measures
(a) by making the official records presumptive evidence that all
constitutional requirements as to such bills had been complied
with, such record to be attacked only by mandamus to correct
the record, and (b) by forbidding a cause of action or defense
in a civil action based on the fact that the governor had signed
a bill more than three days after adjournment.
Are the Validating Acts Constitutional?
The provisions noted under the fourth subdivision are cap-
able of effective attack as undue encroachments upon judicial
authority, but they are not essential to the general purpose
sought to be accomplished. So far as the first point is con-
cerned, it is of doubtful wisdom to enact some fifteen hundred
statutes by blanket description, without even an enumeration,
and such a plan would be clearly invalid under many State con-
stitutions. But, whatever its wisdom, this plan of legislation
does not appear open to constitutional attack in Connecticut.
In opposition to the view just expressed, it may be urged that
that legislature is itself violating the law, for section 35 of the
General Statutes provides that:
"Every bill for a public act amending or repealing any
of the statutes of the state, introduced into the General
Assembly, shall cite the statute to be amended or re-
pealed, or so much thereof as may be necessary to show
the effect of such amendment or repeal."
A sufficient reply is that the special session was validating prior
transactions and reenacting, not amending or repealing. But
even if the validating acts were within the terms of this sec-
tion, one session of the legislature apparently has no authority
to determine how a succeeding session shall exercise powers
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constitutionally belonging to it."" The statute, while announcing
a desirable policy, would most likely not constitute a legal limita-
tion upon the procedure adopted by subsequent legislative ses-
sions.
The issues of importance for judicial determination are, there-
fore, the retroactive effect and validation of prior acts or pro-
ceedings, as indicated under subdivisions (2) and (3) above.
Validating acts have a long history in Connecticut, 21 and re-
troactive laws of certain types have been upheld at least since
1822. And validating acts are retroactive in that they seek to
cure defects in past proceedings. But there are limits upon
such legislation and it is for the court to determine these limits.
The limits are primarily set by the following constitutional pro-
visions:
(1) The federal constitution of 1787 provides that no State
shall pass any ex post facto law.
(2) The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution,
adopted in 1868, forbids any State to deprive any person of
"life, liberty or property without due process of law" or to deny
to any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of
the laws."
(3) The Connecticut constitution of 1818 forbids deprivation
of "life, liberty or property, but by due course of law," and
provides that all men "are equal in rights." These provisions
are substantially the same as the "due process of law" -and
"equal protection of the laws" clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
(4) The Connecticut constitution of 1818 provides that "no
person shall be arrested, detained or punished except in cases
clearly warranted by law."
20 For discussions of the power of one legislative session to re-
strict Its successors in the proposal and submission of constitutional
amendments, see Murphy Chair Co. v. Attorney General, 148 Mich.
563 (1907); Lovett v. Ferguson, 10 S. D. 44 (1897); In re Denny,
156 Ind. 104 (1901); and State v. Davis, 20 Nev. 220 (1888).
21 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (1822); Mather v. Chap-
man, 6 Conn. 54 (1825); Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 190 (1826).
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All four of these provisions may be argued to forbid retro-
active criminal laws. Only the second and third relate to civil
rights. Since the decision by the United States Supreme Court
in 1798 of the Connecticut case of Calder v. Bull,2 2 it has been
established that the prohibition of ex post facto laws relates
only to retroactive criminal laws, and Connecticut has no. con-
stitutional prQvision forbidding retroactive civil laws. The
fourth is explicitly limited to criminal cases. What limits do
these constitutional provisions impose upon retroactive legisla-
tion? This question must be differently answered tinder varying
circumstances. Three classes of cases may be distinguished:
(1) The legislature cannot through a validating act exercise
a power which it never possessed. An act of 1927 sought to
validate the assessment lists and grand lists of t& town of
Branford so far as they assessed a 99 year lease of real property
to the lessee, whereas all other land under lease either in Bran-
ford or elsewhere in the State was taxed to the owner. The
court, through Chief Justice Wheeler, said that such a classifi-
cation denied equal protection of the laws and equality of rights,
and said "Curative acts cannot cure a want of authority to act
at all. * * * A statute will not be permitted to act retro-
spectively so as to validate what was before void because in
conflict with State or federal constitution. Our General As-
sembly was without power to validate what it could not consti-
tutionally authorize. ' 23 But had there been power to do the
thing, and a defect merely in the method of doing it, a validating
act may cure the defect,2" as the same Justice suggested in 1916.
To take a specific illustration, there was a power, later sustained
by the Connecticut Court, to enact the automobile guest act of
1927, but the power was defectively exercised, because the gov-
ernor did not approve in time. Can this defect be corrected by
later legislation, and the act made operative from 1927, or is
the defect incurable as to the past because it arose from what
the court regards as a violation of the constitution? The Bran-
ford case does not answer this question.
22 3 Dallas, 386 (1798).
23 Montgomery v. Town of Branford, 107 Conn., 697 (1928),
pp. 705, 707.
24 Whittelsey v. Town of Windsor Locks, 90 Conn. 312 (1916).
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(2) The legislature cannot pass an act in 1929 and make it
retroactive so as to disturb vested rights or punish acts innocent
at the time of their commission. To punish, by act of 1929,
conduct of 1927, innocent at that time, would clearly be ex post
facto and not "clearly warranted by law." To deprive of vested
property or other interests by retroactive legislation would run
counter to the 14th amendment and to the constitution of Con-
necticut. In 1822, when dealing with a statute validating mar-
riages, the court went farther in the disturbing of established
property rights than it would probably do to-day,2" and than it
might be permitted to do in view of the present construction
of the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme
Court went so far in 1928 as to say that a federal tax statute
proposed in February and approved on June 2, 1924, could not
constitutionally have retroactive effect so as to apply to a gift
made on May 23, 1924.26 But in this case there was no prior
action, or effort to act, upon the part of Congress. If a bill
were passed in 1927, which has the appearance of law and was
generally regarded as law, may legislative action of 1929 retro-
actively cure a defect in the act of 1927 and make it operative?
This question is different from that answered by the United
States Supreme Court. Congress, when it acted in June, 1924,
had no constitutional power to act for a prior period. The Con-
necticut legislature, when it acted in 1927, had power to act
and sought only to act for the future, and the defect was only in
the method of exercising the power. Can such a defect be cured
by subsequent legislation?
(3) Validating acts are freely used in Connecticut and other
States. They will (and must) continue to be used so long as
public officers are human and make mistakes. The Connecticut
rule as to such acts, stated in 1859 and repeated with approval
in 1928 is: "'When a statute is expressly retroactive and the
object and effect of it is to correct an innocent mistake, remedy
a mischief, execute the intention of the parties, and promote
25 Compare Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn, 209 (1822) with
Shay's Appeal, 51 Conn. 162 (1883).
26 Blodgett v. Holden. 275 U. S. 142 (1928); Untermyer v. An-
derson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928).
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justice, then, both as a matter of right and of public policy af-
fecting the peace and welfare of the community, the law should
be sustained. " 27  This is subject to the rule that the legislature
may not by curative legislation validate an act that it never had
power to enact. Clearly, in Connecticut, where the legislature
has authority in the first place to prescribe or dispense with
certain forms, it may retroactively cure a defect due to failure
of administrative officers to comply with forms which it did
prescribe. If it requires a certain form of oath, or action on
a certain day in the levy of a tax, it may retroactively excuse
failure to employ the proper form of oath or to act on the
proper day.
Legislative power to validate is often said to extend to the
ratifying of something which it was lawful for the legislature
to authorize or to do in the first instance.2" But in the present
case, while there was power to pass an automobile guest statute
in 1927, there was, under the decision of the court, no power
to pass such an act subject to executive approval more than
three days after adjournment. If the legislature had prescribed
that a certain act should be performed within a certain time, it
could cure the defect occasioned by failure to do so. Such a
defect would usually in.fact be a matter of administrative detail.
Is the legislature powerless to cure a defect in time of prior
approval of a statute, either because the requirement is a con-
stitutional one or because it is not a matter of administrative
detail? Clearly there is a difference between the present case
and the ordinary case of validation, in that the legislature could
not in the first place have lawfully dispensed with the constitu-
tional requirement as to executive approval.
The extent of power to cure the defect occasioned by the fail-
ure to approve in proper time depends primarily upon the effect
to be given to the legislative action of 1927. The court has said
27 Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97 (1859), p. 102, quoted in
Montgomery v. Town of Branford, 107 Conn. 697 (1928), pp. 704-705.
See also Atkins v. Nichols, 51 Conn. 513 (1884) and Daly v. Fisk, 104
Conn. 579 (1926).
28 For an interesting discussion of validating legislation in an-
other jurisdiction, see E. J. Verlie, Retrospective Legislation in Illi-
nois, 3 University of Illinois Law Bulletin, 28 (1920),
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that acts signed after the three (lay period "are void." But clearly
something was done by the legislature in 1927, and reliance
was generally placed upon what the legislature then did. Can
effect be given to such action of 1927 by curative legislation of
1929? Obviously the legislature could not in 1929 deprive the
motor vehicle guest of substantially all remedy for injury, and
make this deprivation apply retroactively back to 1927. To do so
would be violative of due process of law, but the legislature is
not doing merely this. It is taking an action of 1927, generally
supposed to be law, and seeking to cure a defect in its enactment.
But if the act of 1927 was void, can the defect be cured? This
depends upon the effect to be given to it. Mr. Justice Field,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, said in 1886:
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inopera-
tive as though it had never been passed."'2 9
If we take this view, there is nothing to cure or validate. Mr.
Chief Justice Butler of the Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut said in 1871:
"Every law of the legislature, however repugnant to
the constitution, has not only the appearance and sem-
blance of authority, but the force of law. It cannot be
questioned at the bar of private judgment, and if thought
unconstitutional resisted, but must be received and obeyed,
as to all intents and purposes law, until questioned in and
set aside by the courts. This principle is essential to the
very existence of order in society."30
Under this view there is something to cure or validate, unless
it be urged that the defect in executive approval prevented the
earlier creation of a "law of the legislature." The modern ten-
dency of the courts is more liberal than the view expressed by
Mr. Justice Field. With numerous acts passed by State legisla-
tures, and observed as law for long periods by the people, undue
confusion and difficulty is created by denying all effect to acts
29 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 (188{).
30 State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 472 (1871).
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subsequently held invalid by the courts. There is much to be
said for the present judicial tendency of permitting later legisla-
tion to validate proceedings under void statutes, and later legis-
lative amendments to transfer void into valid statutes. 1 De-
cisions upholding such actions directly support the recent vali-
dating acts of Connecticut, and find support in utterances of
the Connecticut court. Such a view would support the validating
acts, irrespective of whether they confirm deprivations of civil
rights or ratify criminal penalties imposed under earlier acts.
If such validation did not deprive of due process of law in civil
matters it would apparently not be ex post facto as to criminal
matters.
The Situation if Validating Acts are Unconstitutional.
But what would be the situation if the court takes a different
view, and holds that the various acts sought to be validated at
the special session of 1929 are void, and are of no effect until
their reenactment in 1929? As to completed transactions between
private parties, entered into in reliance upon such acts, there
would seem to be little difference in result. The doctrine of
estoppel would almost certainly in such cases be employed to
prevent either of the parties from escaping the liabilities or
duties that he had assumed. The same would be true of trans-
actions entered into between individuals on the one hand and
the State or other governmental bodies on the other in reliance
upon such laws. If the State had purchased property from an
individual or had sold property to the individual, either party
31 The effect of unconstitutional statutes is most adequately cov-
ered in a series of articles prepared, under the supervision of the pres-
ent writer, by Professor Oliver P. Field of the University of Minneso-
ta: The effect of an Unconstitutional Statute in the Law of Public
Officers: Effect of Official Status, 13 Minnesota Law Review, 439
(1929); The Status of a Private Corporation Organized under an Un-
constitutional -Statute, 17 California Law Review 327 (1929); The
Status of a -Municipal Corporation Organiized under an Unconstitution-
al Statute, 27 Michigan Law Review, 523 (1929); The Effect of an Un-
constitutional Statute in the Law of Public Officers: Liability of Of-
ficer for Action or Non-Action, 77 University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view. 155 (1928). See also Oliver P. Field, Effect of an .Unconstitu-
tional Statute, 1 Indiana Law Review, 1, and 100 Central Law Journal,
145 (1927), and Max P. Rapacz, Protection of Officers'who Act under
Unconstitutional Statutes, 11 Minnesota Law Review, 585 (1927).
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would almost certainly be estopped from alleging that the trans-
action was improper, unless he were able to place the other party
in the same position as that existing prior to the transaction.
Nor is difficulty likely to present itself with respect to the
ordinary transactions and administrative details of State and
local government. With respect to taxes collected under the
laws involved in the validating acts, little difficulty would present
itself, because of the substantial impossibility of recovering taxes
voluntarily paid.
With respect to criminal proceedings, differences in situations
present themselves. A person who may have been convicted
and who has served his sentence for violation of the aviation
act of 1927 would have little in the way of redress. Technically
he has been unlawfully deprived of his liberty under a void
statute, if the invalidity of the statute has not been cured by
the validating act. What remedy would he have for such de-
privation? His redress, if any, would be by suit against some-
one. He has no remedy by suit against the State. Under
modern decisions there is little possibility of his being permitted
to recover damages from the person making the complaint, from
the officer making the arrest, or from the jailer or warden who
may have detained him in confinement either before conviction
or under sentence after conviction. The judge who presided
at his trial would clearly be subject to no liability under the
great weight of authority. If a validating act has been ineffec-
tive to cure defects in the proceeding under which the person
has been imprisoned, he is in the position of one who has suf-
fered a legal injury but who has no remedy.
The individual who has been convicted, let us say under the
same statute, but who has not yet completed the service of his
sentence, will be in a different position, should the validating acts
be held not to cure all defects. He would be entitled to release.
But is he entitled to release merely by demanding it? Would
the jailer or warden be liable for detaining him until there should
be an actual decision as to the validity of the act under which he
was committed, or a decision as to the validity of the validating
act? Under the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut in 1871 and quoted above, there would seem to be
HeinOnline  -- 3 Conn. B.J. 237 1929
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
no liability attached to the person so detaining the convicted
person, until there were a specific determination by the court,
making clear that the detention is illegal.
Irrespective, therefore, of whether the validating acts be re-
garded as curing all defects of the various acts rendered void
under the McCook decision, there would be little material dif-
ference as to completed civil transactions, and no very great
difficulty with respect to criminal proceedings under the statutes.
But inequalities would result in many cases, if the validating
acts do not cure past defects. Take the automobile guest statute
of 1927, for example. A guest who has sought damages for
injury between 1927 and 1929, and who was denied relief be-
cause of this statute, is now precluded from again seeking re-
lief, if his case has been closed. But the person injured as a
guest during the same period and perhaps on the same day,
whose case has not yet been tried or closed, may be permitted
to allege the invalidity of the statute and to obtain relief, if the
validating acts do not accomplish their purpose as to past trans-
actions. Similar inequalities would present themselves as to
other statutes, and where the original enactment may have oc-
curred ten years ago, the number of such inequalities would be
greater than under a statute enacted in 1927. Inequalities ot
the same type would present themselves in criminal cases.
Conclusions.
From what is said above the following general conclusions
may be drawn:
(1) The Connecticut legislature has power to reenact, by
the blanket process, all of the various laws affected by the Mc-
Cook decision, so far as such reenactment is to bring these laws
into operation for the future.
(2) The effort of the special session of the Connecticut
legislature to control the merit of cases and the weight of evi-
deuce is of doubtful validity, because an infringement upon
powers properly judicial.
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(3) There is substantial argument in support of the power
of the legislature to validate transactions under the statutes ren-
dered void by the terms of the McCook decision.
(4) If there is no legislative power to validate acts done
under the statutes rendered invalid by the McCook decision, the
same result as that sought by the validating acts is accomplished
as to numerous prior transactions, and particularly as to com-
pleted transactions, under other legal rules recognized by the
Connecticut court. But inequalities would result which may be
avoided by sustaining the validating acts.
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